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1. Introduction 
 
One of the main debates in economics and economic history concerns the analysis of the great 
divergence between the West and the Rest. Historical National Accounts are of vital importance to 
address this issue. Ever since Simon Kuznets embarked upon his ambitious project to chart the long-
run economic development of countries, historians and economists have tried to construct datasets on 
long-run economic growth and structural change. This research seems to be flourishing nowadays as 
many “regional initiatives” have been taken to construct the historical national accounts for East Asia, 
Latin America and Europe. 
  Now that more and more detailed historical national accounts are made available, it is time to 
focus more on the comparability of these estimates. Even a superficial glance at the data reveals that 
data are constructed on the basis of very different methods, which undermines the possibility of sound 
international comparisons. It is for this reason that we have recently started a new research project at 
the  Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) into the construction of comparative 
historical national accounts. This project is supported by the International Economic History 
Association which stimulates the formation of data-hubs in various research domains in economic 
history. 
  In this paper I want to present an outline of this new project and discuss some of the 
methodological issues involved (see section 2). I will emphasise three of the most problematic areas 
which hamper a sound comparison of levels and rates of growth, i.e. the treatment of services (section 
3), the use of deflators (section 4) and the construction of historical purchasing power parities (PPP’s) 
(section 5). 
 
2. Standardising Historical National Accounts 
Ever since Kuznets initiated the research into long-term economic growth, researchers have been 
active in constructing datasets for their respective countries. All these research efforts culminate in the 
regular publications by Angus Maddison
2, who devotes an incredible amount of time and energy in 
tracking down these data, encouraging scholars to start working on the historical accounts for 
countries for which no data are available, and to make the various estimates more comparable. Thanks 
                                                 
1  I thank Jop Woltjer for helping me out with the section on deflation. Comments and feedback welcome at: 
j.p.h.smits@rug.nl 
2  See for example: A. Maddison, The world economy: a millenial perspective (Paris-OECD, 2001). 
  1to these huge efforts we now have a dataset at our disposal which covers large parts of the world 
economy for long periods of time.
3 
  Of course the work of Maddison can be criticised on a number of points. For example, for a 
couple of countries the GDP series could and should be improved. There is a general consensus among 
German scholars that the original Hoffmann estimates are flawed and need to be revised. Besides, in 
Maddison’s dataset only one recent benchmark is used to convert the current price estimates of the 
various countries into one common denominator. It would, of course, be better to take relative price 
changes over time into account by making Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) comparisons for earlier 
benchmark years. These points of criticism should not be aimed at Angus Maddison, ‘le Grand Maitre’, 
himself. In case individual series for particular countries are flawed, this is first of all the responsibility 
of the researchers of the countries in question. In presenting his grand overviews, Maddison can’t offer 
more than researchers in the field of historical national accounting have been producing themselves. 
  The new research project that has been started at the Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre aims to build on the previous –ongoing- work of Maddison. We intend to present historical 
national accounts data for the period 1870-present, but in more detail than has been done so far. In 
order to enhance the analysis of structural change, we will disaggregate the GDP data at least by 
giving sector estimates (agriculture, industry and services) and preferably by covering 25-30 
underlying industries. Besides, for the western countries attempts will be made to include estimates 
from the income- and expenditure side. Last but not least, due attention will be paid to the 
standardisation of these estimates. 
  The project ‘An International Historical Database on Economic Growth and Development’ 
(carried out by Jan-Pieter Smits and Herman de Jong) is supported by the International Economic 
History Association and financed by the Dutch science foundation (NWO). In this project we will 
closely co-operate with existing networks in the field of historical national accounting. It is our 
intention to build a data hub, a central place were the data will be stored, described and updated, but 
which is linked to existing datasets that are constructed by other researchers. For example, our 
database will be linked to the Eastern Asian research project carried out at Hitutsubashi University 
under the supervision of Fukao. For the Latin American countries, contacts have been established with 
Carreras, Hofman and Yanez  who attempt to extend and standardise the time series of the various 
Latin American countries. Last but not least, the GGDC project will be embedded in ESF/SCSS 
Scientific Programme Globalizing Europe Economic History Network (GLOBALEURONET), co-
ordinated by Batilossi (Carlos III, Madrid)  in which 13 countries among which the Netherlands 
participate. Within this programme the Groningen Growth and Development Centre will organise 
workshops and seminars aimed at standardising economic growth estimates for the countries both in 
‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe. 
                                                 
3  Publications and data from Angus Maddison can be found at the website of the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre: http://www.ggdc.net/Maddison/. 
  2  Furthermore, this historical research is linked to more contemporary work that is already 
carried out within the research group of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
4 Above all 
the EU KLEMS project (Productivity in the European Union: A Comparative Industry Approach) 
should be mentioned. This project aims to create a database on measures of economic growth, 
productivity, employment creation, capital formation and technological change at the industry level for 
all European Union member states from 1970 onwards. Productivity measures will be developed, in 
particular with growth accounting techniques. Several measures on knowledge creation will also be 
constructed. Substantial methodological and data research on these measures will be carried out to 
improve international comparability. There will be ample attention for the development of a flexible 
database structure, and for the progressive implementation of the database in official statistics over the 
course of the project. 
  This project is funded by the European Commission, Research Directorate General as part of 
the 6th Framework Programme, Priority 8, "Policy Support and Anticipating Scientific and 
Technological Needs". The research consortium is led by the Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre of the University of Groningen (The Netherlands) and the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research in London.  
 
The new historical database project is closely linked to these projects. However, except from sharing 
and linking data, this GGDC project also aims to provide some important, and perhaps crucial, new 
elements. First of all, we aim to put the disaggregated, standardised data on the GGDC-website 
(http://www.ggdc.net)  and make the datasets downloadable. Apart from that, there are some specific 
areas in which additional research will be done to standardise the various time series: 
1)  The treatment of the service sector: during the last two decades new estimation procedures 
have been developed in order to measure output and productivity in services. However, in 
many of the first generations of historical national accounts (such as those of Great Britain, 
France and Germany) unsound estimation procedures have been followed. The measurement 
of service output needs to be standardised (section 3) 
2)   The use of deflators: researchers in various countries use different deflation techniques. Often, 
without a clear methodological justification, use is made of Paasche, Divisia, or other price 
indices. Especially the question whether weighting schemes should be changed annually, or 
that we should stick to weighting schemes for period of 15-20 years, must be discussed more 
thoroughly. In this section 4 of this paper I will show how different deflation techniques may 
impact on the GDP growth rates that are calculated. 
3)  The construction of historical benchmark PPP’s: economists and historians often use data 
expressed in dollars of 1985 or 1990 in order to make international comparisons of income 
                                                 
4  The information of EU Klems is derived from the website: http://www.euklems.net. 
  3and productivity levels. However, the relative price structure of the late 20
th century may not 
be representative for earlier periods in time. Recently interesting attempts have been made to 
develop expenditure PPP’s for early benchmark years. In this last part of the paper I will 
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the expenditure- vis-à-vis the industry-of-origin 
approach. Moreover, new industry-of-origin estimates will be presented for a couple of 
Western countries around 1910. 
 
3. The treatment of services 
The measurement of service production has always been problematic.
5  There are different 
measurement techniques of service output in historical national accounting as well as contemporary 
national accounting.
6 In addition, historical estimates of service output often faces data problems, 
because we do not have all of the required information at our disposal. Output measurement for 
agriculture and manufacturing is less difficult, as it basically consists of summing the quantities times 
the prices of goods. This procedure is impossible to follow for many service industries. Only for 
branches such as transport and communications, such a ‘commodity’ approach is applicable. Output in 
many other service industries is arrived at by means of input valuation, i.e. adding the value of inputs, 
mostly wages. Of course, this procedure has a major shortcoming. Output is not estimated 
independently of inputs, and, as a consequence, cannot be used for productivity purposes.  
  In this section an overview is presented of the estimation procedures that have been applied in 
the first generation of historical national accounting –for example the United Kingdom and Germany- 
and how these estimates can and should be improved.. 
 
Transport 
Output volume in transports is ideally estimated by multiplying the number of passengers and the 
tonnage of goods transported with the distance of transportation. In this way the output volume of the 
transport sector is expressed as the number of passenger kilometres and the number of ton kilometres. 
Next these output figures are linked to freight rates, that is the weighted price of transportation per 
passenger kilometre or per ton kilometre. This results in the value of output. Finally, the value of 
inputs are deducted in order to arrive at the estimates of value added. 
  In most countries such estimates have not been made. Often value added has been calculated 
by multiplying employment figures with data on the average income. For instance Feinstein and 
Hoffmann use this method to estimate production in the transport sector for a benchmark year around 
                                                 
5  The first part of this section, with the overview of the different ways in which service output can be calculated, 
is taken from: A. Burger and J.P. Smits, “A benchmark comparison of service productivity between Europe and 
the United States for 1910”, Economic and Social History in the Netherlands, special issue: Historical National 
Accounts in the Netherlands 7 (1996) 133-159.  
6  Cf. Z. Griliches (ed.), Output measurement in the service sectors (Chicago, 1993); O. Krantz, “Service 
production in historical national accounts”, Review of Income and Wealth (1994).   
  41910.
7 Direct estimates from the  output side (i.e. the actual calculation of outputs and inputs) are 
scarce. Yet, in the Swedish and Dutch historical national accounts much work has been done in this 
respect.
8 For the Unites States the work of Gallmann and Weiss should be mentioned.
9 By using 
annual reports of important transport companies, gross earnings and the value of inputs can be 
calculated. However, in many other countries ‘guestimates’ from the input side are made. 
  The quality of benchmark estimates may be questionable, even more serious problems arise if 
we try to analyse growth patterns for the pre-1913 period. It was already mentioned that in most 
countries 1910/13 estimates were projected backwards using all sorts of production (volume) indices. 
Hoffmann was one of the few who used actual data on output volume such as the number of passenger 
kilometres and ton kilometres. In the British historical national accounts, however, rough indicators 
were used to make backward projections. For instance, Feinstein was able to estimate value added for 
transport for the benchmark year 1907. Next, series on production volume (derived from Lewis) were 
used in order to extrapolate the 1907 estimates backwards.
10 In this way a transport series in constant 
prices was constructed. For railways it was simply assumed that that production in the period 1855-
1907 increased at a rate of 3% a year. As far as sea shipping is concerned Lewis used used the total 
tonnage of Britain’s merchant fleet as an indicator for production. Because of the fact that steam ships 
were sailing at greater speed, the tonnage of steam ships was multiplied by a factor 3. Furthermore, on 
the basis of data from the foreign trade statistics, it was assumed that the rate of utilisation in sea 
transport increased with 0,5% a year. 
  Of course serious criticism can be levelled against such assumptions. First of all, no estimate 
of the actual volume of transportation was made. For example, no attention is paid to possible changes 
in the average distance. Furthermore, changes in input/output relations were disregarded. Thus, the 
effect of technological and organisational changes in transport is not measured. Moreover, it should be 
noted that by using a fixed set of prices, changes in relative prices are not reflected in the production 
estimates for earlier years. 
  
Trade 
The analysis of productivity in trade causes even greater problems. Mostly value added in trade was 
calculated for a benchmark year around 1910 on the basis of data on employment and average income 
(see the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States). As far as the construction of time-series in 
concerned the growth of distribution is often calculated on the basis of agricultural and industrial 
                                                 
7  W.G. Hoffmann, Das Wachstum der Deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1965); 
C.H. Feinstein, National income, expenditure and output of the United Kingdom, 1855-1965 (Cambridge, 1972). 
8  O. Krantz, “Historical national accounts –some methodological notes’, Scandinavian Economic History 
Review 2 (1983); J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden, Dutch GNP and its components (Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre, Research monograph no. 5, 2000). 
9  Gallman and Weiss, “Gross national product in the United States 1834-1909’, Output, employment and 
productivity in the United States after 1800 (New York, 1966). 
10  W.A. Lewis, Growth and fluctuations 1870-1913 (London, 1978). 
  5output figures as well as the value of imports. In the British historical national accounts, for example, 
the growth is considered to be equal to the growth of the output volume in agriculture, manufacturing, 
mining and the volume of imports (including re-exports). 
  In Germany more or less the same method is followed. Hoffmann, however, stressed that his 
estimates are of a tentative nature.
11 In his calculations it was assumed that no elimination of 
intermediate trade took place. This means that trade margins (i.e. the difference between sales and 
purchases values) are supposed to be constant throughout the period 1850-1913. Such an assumption 
may not plausible. For example, in the period  1890-1913 trade margins in the Unites States were 
rising. 
  There are strong indications that trade margins did not remain constant during the nineteenth 
century. First of all, important structural changes took place in retail trade. The rise of multiple shop 
organisations and department stores had a decisive impact on productivity and on the development of 
trade margins. Furthermore, innovations in the field of transport and communication made an 
elimination of intermediate trade possible, as a result of which the costs of distribution could be 
lowered substantially. 
  To arrive at more reliable estimates for value added in trade it is therefore important to 
establish trade margins for wholesale and retail trade. On the basis of records of trading companies and 
by comparing levels of different types of prices (producer prices, wholesale prices and retail prices) 
trade margins can be established. Next we can check the validity of such estimates by calculations 
from the income side, i.e. by using employment data and information on average incomes. 
 
Other services (mainly government and domestic servants) 
Production in this segment of services is mostly estimated by combining employment data with figures 
on average income. For the period around World War I we are amply provided with such data. 
Analysing productivity changes over time, however, leads to serious problems. If the production series 
(calculated as employment multiplied by income) are deflated by wage indices, it is supposed that 
productivity did not rise. Of course this is not plausible. In the Swedish historical national accounts 
Krantz therefore tried to construct indicators for the development of productivity. For example, he 
used the number of patients in hospitals as an indicator for the production in medical services, and for 
education the number of pupils was used. 
  It should be noted that the income estimates are not always comparable because of different 
methods of deflation and the underlying assumptions concerning productivity changes.
12 Lewis, for 
instance, supposes that productivity in the ‘income related’ services (i.e. government, domestic 
servants, professions and other personal services) increased with an average of 0.5% a year. In most 
                                                 
11  Hoffmann, Das Wachstum. 
12  O. Krantz, “Historical national accounts”. 
  6other countries such an adjustment was not made, as a result of which the British estimates on services 
for the pre-1907 period are not comparable with those of other countries. 
 
It is clear that especially in the historical national accounts of the first generations, short-cuts were 
used to estimate service output. This might distort the international comparison of growth rates, 
especially as services comprise a substantial part of GDP in high-income countries such as the United 
Kingdom and Germany. 
  In an updated version of this paper, new service estimates will be presented for the UK and 
Germany, by applying modern estimation techniques. For now I just present a sensitivity analysis on 
the basis of the Dutch database
13. The following tables compare estimated of service output as they 
were calculated in the Dutch historical national accounts, with counter-factual outcomes using the 
short-cut estimation procedures as they were used in the British accounts (mainly the work of W.A. 
Lewis). 
  
Distribution: 
Table 1 shows the outcomes of the original value added estimates for distribution made in the Dutch 
historical accounts, compared to the short-cut method that was used in the British accounts and which 
was applied to the Dutch basic data. 
 
Table 1: Value added of distribution (at constant prices; Dutch Guilders of 1913) 
 shortcut  original 
1850 100,1 108,9 
1890 186,1 246,2 
 
The ‘shortcut’ method seems to underestimate the levels of output of trade (in 1850 8% lower, in 1890 
even 24.1% lower!). Especially after 1890 the trade sector shows much more growth when we use the 
shortcut method. The main reason why the two methods yield such different results is that the short-
cut method does not take changes in trade margins into account. However, these margins were far 
from constant during the nineteenth century. For example, large parts of intermediate trade were 
eliminated as a result of better transport and communication facilities. Besides, a distinction should be 
made between wholesale trade and retail trade. The larger growth of trade until 1890 according to the 
calculations carried out in the Dutch national accounts project, stems from the fact that retail trade –
which is characterised by relatively high trade margins- witnessed strong growth in the period 1850-
1890.  
 
                                                 
13  Cf. J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden, Dutch GNP and its components, 1800-1913 (Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre, 2005). This monograph can be downloaded at: http://www.ggdc.net. Go to 
DHNA (Dutch Historical National Accounts). Here the monograph as well as some of the time series can be 
downloaded. 
  7Transport: 
Also in the transport sector substantial differences can be demonstrated. 
 
Table 2: Value added of maritime shipping (at constant prices; Dutch Guilders of 1913) 
 shortcut  original 
1850 5,3 6,0 
1890 29,2  5,5 
 
In the case of maritime shipping, the shortcut method clearly produces implausible results. Apparently, 
capital-output ratios are not constant as was assumed in the Lewis series (which takes the capacity of 
the merchant fleet as the basis for the output estimates). Perhaps even more important, the shortcut 
method ignores changes in input/output relations. The Dutch data, however, indicate that the costs of 
input showed a relative increase. From the late 1860s the freight rates in merchant shipping 
plummeted, whereas input costs remained constant or even increased. 
  
Table 3: Value added of railways (at constant prices; Dutch Guilders of 1913) 
 
 shortcut  Original 
1850 9,1 0,8 
1890 29,6 23,1 
 
Here, the differences for 1890 are quite limited. However, with the shortcut method -which simply 
assumes a fixed 3% growth rate in the pre-1913 period- we arrive at a much higher level. This should 
not come as a surprise, as the Dutch railway network was still in its infancy around 1850 and in these 
early years of course higher rates of growth were realised. 
 
Other services: 
The main difference in the estimation methods for the other services concerns the assumption that has 
been made in the shortcut method, i.e. that productivity in the other services increased with 0,5% a 
year. Of course, when the absolute figures for 1910 are being projected backwards on indices with and 
without such a productivity adjustment, we arrive at different estimates for the earlier benchmark years. 
 
Table 4: Value added of other services (at constant prices; Dutch Guilders of 1913) 
 shortcut  original 
1850 133,0 151,2 
1890 285,4 320,3 
 
In the years 1890 and 1850 the output of the remaining services is 11 respectively 12% lower than the 
figure that was calculated in the Dutch historical national accounts. Especially over longer time 
periods, productivity assumptions have a huge influence on output levels for earlier years. 
  8  
Total services: 
In table 5 these results are aggregated to a sector level. 
 
Table 5: Value added of total services (at constant prices; Dutch Guilders of 1913) 
 Shortcut  original 
1850 267,1 302,8 
1890 610,6 655,6 
 
Adding all the information together, we find that the shortcut estimates which were followed in the 
United Kingdom and partly also in Germany, yield lower levels of service output in earlier benchmark 
years. In 1890 value added is 6,7% lower than the actual calculations show, in 1850 a difference of 
even 12% is reached. 
  These differences are considerable. Of course these figures do not automatically imply that the 
British and German figures are actually 7-12% too low in the pre-1913 period. However, this 
sensitivity analysis shows that the methods which have been applied in the older generations of 
historical national accounts, may yield implausible outcomes. 
  These problems can be overcome. It is not too difficult to ‘upgrade’ the estimates of these first 
generation accounts. With some additional research into (relative) prices and taking input/output 
changes into account, better estimates can be produced. This can be done mainly on the basis of of 
Statistical Yearbooks and Foreign Trade statistics. In an updated version of this paper, such estimates 
will be presented. 
  
4. Deflation procedures 
The problems regarding deflation are often dismissed as technical number-crunching, an issue that 
only national account nerds are interested in. And indeed, testing  the different methods to transform 
current price series into constant prices may not be one of the most exciting tasks for economic 
historians. Yet, deflation is a problem which should be taken seriously as it might have serious 
analytical implications. 
  Even a quick review of the ways in which the problem of deflation has been dealt with, reveals 
that there are almost as many deflation techniques as there are historical national accounts. Some of 
these differences stem from source-related reasons. In some countries, where estimates could only be 
made at a sector level (agriculture, industry and services), the construction of the deflator is based on a 
limited number of price indices. In countries with a large number of underlying series, the aggregate 
GDP deflator is often based on 20-30 sub series. 
  A second difference, concerns the weighting schemes that are used. Especially in the first 
generation of historical national accounts, mostly one fixed price set (often around 1910) is used. In 
the later generations, weighting schemes are periodically changed. In the case of Sweden and the 
  9Netherlands the weights are changed every 15-20 years. Some researchers even argue that it is 
desirable to change weights on an annual basis. Last but not least, different types of deflators are used. 
Many economic historians follow the United Nations National Accounting (SNA) guidelines and use 
Paasche-type deflators, but often also Fischer, Thornqvist and Divisia price indices are used. 
   Of course, different types of deflation techniques yield different results. Therefore, databases 
on long-run growth unfortunately contain heterogeneous time series. This raises concern with respect 
to the comparability of growth estimates, as we might end up analysing different deflation techniques 
rather than actual differences in GDP growth rates. 
  It is not easy to standardise deflation procedures for the present set of historical national 
accounts that we have at our disposal. For example, in the first generation of historical national 
accounts (such as the United Kingdom and Germany), a fixed price set for 1910 is used and there are 
no underlying price series at industry level given to re-calculate the deflator. 
  I therefore use another kind of sensitivity analysis to try to figure out whether differences in 
deflation techniques might indeed disturb our view of the long-run growth patterns. As we have rather 
detailed information at our disposal in the Dutch Historical National Accounts, we have re-estimated 
Dutch real GDP growth (i.e. at constant prices), using different types of deflators. However, it should 
be noted that the Dutch economy witnessed only a modest degree of structural change (in terms of 
shifts from agriculture to other branches of the economy), which implies that the effects of choosing 
different deflators might be less important than for countries which witnessed more structural change. 
  In this sensitivity analysis 14 different types of deflators were applied. The first seven series 
are calculated on the basis of a sub division of GDP in only three sectors: agriculture, industry and 
services: 
 
Deflation based at price indices for three sectors 
 
A fixed price set for 1913: 
-Series 1: fixed price set for 1913 
 
Periodically changing weighting schemes. The period 1890-1913 is weighted using the relative 
prices for 1913, 1870-1890 with 1890 etc etc. The weighting schemes are changed every twenty years, 
and subsequently all series were linked and the final series are also expressed at constant prices of 
1913 
 
-Series 2: Paasche index 
-Series 3: Laspeyres index 
-Series 4: Fischer index 
 
Annually changing weighting schemes, a chain index 
-Series 5: Paasche index 
-Series 6: Laspeyres index 
-Series 7: Fischer index 
 
  10The seven different types of deflation have been applied on the current price series for agriculture, 
industry and services. This results in seven new series on GDP at constant prices. These series have 
been compared to the ‘ideal’  outcome, and that is the series the way we calculated them in our Dutch 
historical accounts (Paasche deflator, on the basis of 20-yearly changing weighting schemes). I 
characterise this series as ‘ideal’, as we follow the United Nations SNA guideline to use a Paasche 
index and Olle Krantz’ recommendation to use periodically changing weighting schemes. Table 6 
reports to what extent GDP levels as calculated according to the 7 different ways of deflating, differ 
from the original Dutch estimates. 
 
Table 6: Comparing the effects of different deflators on the levels of GDP (in %) 
  1  2  34567  
1807 6,2 3,0  -3,4 -0,3      
1830 2,6 2,3  -1,6 0,3 1,5 0,9 1,2 
1850 5,8 4,9 0,9 2,9 4,7 2,4 3,5 
1870 3,9 3,6 2,2 2,9 3,2 3,1 3,1 
1890 2,4 2,4 1,8 2,1 2,5 2,3 2,4 
Note: The differences in GDP levels are calculated as follow. With each deflator (1-14) we estimated GDP levels. 
These levels were compared to the one we arrived at using method no 14 (periodically changing weighting 
schemes of a Paasche type). The difference we found was expressed as a percentage of the GDP level according 
to method 14. 
 
Even a deflation on the basis of only three underlying price series gives substantial differences. 
Especially in case of using a fixed price set for 1910 –such as has been done for the United Kingdom 
and Germany- the results are quite different. This fixed price approach results in GDP levels that are 
6% lower in 1807 and 1850 than when we use periodically changing weighting schemes of a Paasche 
type. 
 
Exactly the same procedure has been repeated, but now with a GDP deflator which is not based on just 
the three sector deflators, but which takes into account the circa 25 underlying price indices for the 
main branches within agriculture, industry and services. 
 
Deflation based on 25 price indices at industry level 
 
A fixed price set for 1913: 
-Series 8: fixed price set for 1913 
 
Periodically changing weighting schemes 
-Series 9: Paasche index 
-Series 10: Laspeyres index 
-Series 11: Fischer index 
 
Annually changing weighting schemes, a chain index 
-Series 12: Paasche index 
-Series 13: Laspeyres index 
-Series 14: Fischer index 
  11 
Also here we compare the GDP outcomes at constant prices, using deflation techniques 8-14 with the 
original estimation procedures used in the Dutch Historical National Accounts 
 
Table 7: Comparing the effects of different deflators on the levels of GDP (in %) 
 
 8  9  10 11 12 13 14 
1807 16,6  0,0  -33,5 -18,4 -11,0 -16,8 -13,9 
1830 7,8 0,0  -25,6 -13,7 -6,0 -4,6 -5,3 
1850 6,1 0,0  -19,0 -10,0 -4,6 -3,2 -3,9 
1870 2,2 0,0  -8,3 -4,3 -2,6 -0,1 -1,3 
1890 0,0 0,0  -4,0 -2,0 -2,1 -2,9 -2,5 
Note: The differences in GDP levels are calculated as follow. With each deflator (1-14) we estimated GDP levels. 
These levels were compared to the one we arrived at using method no 14 (periodically changing weighting 
schemes of a Paasche type). The difference we found was expressed as a percentage of the GDP level according 
to method 14. 
 
Table 7 shows that in case deflation procedures are applied to a larger number of underlying price 
indices, the margins of error are considerably larger. In case of a three-sector deflation procedure, a 
6% difference between various types of deflation is the maximum. In the case of a more extensive 
deflation procedure –working with ca. 25 underlying price series- the differences are much larger. In 
case of GDP estimates for the year 1807, the use of fixed 1910 prices results in a GDP level 16,6% 
higher, whereas Fischer indices which are based on re-weighted and linked time series, result in GDP 
levels that are 10-15% lower than the original estimates. The margins of error are considerable. 
  Graph 1 reports the difference between two extreme types of deflation procedures. The 
‘simple’ procedure applies to a three-sector model, with a fixed price set for 1910. This scenario is 
chosen as for many less developed economies or other regions with a lack of primary statistics, this 
might be the maximum level of sophistication that can be expected. The ‘sophisticated’ procedure 
relates to a Paasche price index, with a periodical change of weighting schemes. Graph 1 shows how 
much higher or lower GDP levels are according to the ‘simple’ procedure. This difference is expressed 
as a percentage of GDP calculated according to the ‘sophisticated’ procedure. 
 
 
 
Graph 1: Differences in GDP levels according to two different deflation techniques, 1807-1913 
(in %). 
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This graph shows that these two deflation techniques yield different results. In the early nineteenth 
century the ‘simple’ deflation procedure results in an over-statement of GDP of more than 9%. 
Besides, this graph indicates that the difference between the two deflation procedures does not change 
smoothly over time. Long-term trends as well as annual fluctuations are seriously influenced by the 
choice of deflation techniques. 
  
5. The problem of PPP’s 
One of the key questions in economic history concerns the question which countries are at the 
technological frontier, and to what extent other countries are able to catch-up. In order to assess the 
relative economic strength of nations over long periods of time, we need to have reliable information 
about productivity differentials. Unfortunately, one of the main problems with the international 
comparison of GDP levels concerns prices. Well-known datasets such as the Penn World tables or 
Maddison’s dataset, work with one set of relative prices (dollars of 1990). The use of such a recent set 
of prices might distort our view on the comparative productivity performance of countries in earlier 
time periods. It is necessary to make proper comparisons of purchasing power parities (PPPs) for 
earlier benchmark years, as relative prices have changed over time, . 
  Fortunately, in recent years a lot of interesting research is done in this field. First of all the 
work of Ward and Devereux should be mentioned.
14 Their new estimates of PPPs seem to have 
significant analytical implications concerning the relative strength of the British versus the United 
                                                 
14  M. Ward and J. Devereux, ‘Measuring British decline: Direct versus long-span income measures’, Journal of 
Economic History 63-3 (2003) 826-851. 
  13States economy in the nineteenth century. Also the re-estimation of East Asian PPPs by Fukao, Ma 
and Yuan opens new perspectives on the comparative economic performance of nations.
15 Both these 
studies construct historical PPPs from an expenditure perspective. Consumer prices are being selected 
and weighted on the share of the relating products in total consumption. This approach has the main 
attraction that with a relatively small sample of circa 20-30 products, reliable PPP estimates can be 
made. This method is aimed at measuring differences in living standards, as only final consumer 
goods are taken into account and consumer prices (including distribution costs and taxes) are being 
used. 
  The research group of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre follows a different 
route and estimates PPPs using the industry-of-origin method. This method is chosen as we are 
primarily interested in analysing productivity differentials, and therefore not only include final 
consumer goods, but also capital goods and intermediate products. Besides, we base our calculations 
not on expenditure- but on producer prices to get a clear view of the efficiency of production processes. 
The comparative productivity of economies can be analysed at quite a detailed level, as the PPPs are 
estimated at branch level.  
  Since 1983 a substantial research effort has been undertaken within the GGDC to carry out 
industry of origin comparisons of sectoral output and productivity across countries.
16 The International 
Comparisons of Output and Productivity (ICOP) project was initiated by Angus Maddison. The ICOP 
project now covers about 30 countries in Asia, East and West Europe, and North and South America. 
Comparisons of manufacturing output and productivity, which are based on unit value ratio 
comparisons and disaggregated into 16 manufacturing branches, are available for almost all of these 
countries. Comparisons for agriculture, transport and communication and wholesale and retail trade 
are available for a smaller group of countries. Comparisons for all sectors of the economy, adding up 
to total GDP, are available for Brazil, Japan, Korea, Mexico and the United States. 
  Over the years the ICOP has extended cooperation with other universities and research 
institutes which carry out ICOP-type productivity studies. These include the Eindhoven Centre for 
Innovation Studies (ECIS) at the Technical University Eindhoven, the National Institute for Economic 
and Social Research (London, the Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales 
(Paris), and the Department of Business Studies at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. Since 1997 
the Economics Department of The Conference Board is sponsoring this programme, and makes use of 
its results for economic analysis. 
  A key characteristic of the ICOP is the use of industry-specific purchasing power parities (or 
unit value ratios) to convert output in national currencies to a common currency, e.g. US dollars. In 
contrast to other studies, these comparisons are therefore not based on exchange rates or PPPs for total 
                                                 
15  K. Fukao, D. Ma and T. Yuan, ‘Real GDP in Pre-War East Asia: A 1934-36 benchmark purchasing power 
parity comparison with the US’ (research paper, january 2006) 
16 For more information about the ICOP project, see: http//www.ggdc.net 
  14GDP, but take into account differences in relative price levels between industries. In most cases 
countries are compared on a binary basis with the USA as the numéraire country. In some cases (for 
example East European countries) comparisons have been made with West Germany; in some other 
cases with the United Kingdom (Spain and Portugal); in some other cases with France (Morocco, 
Tunisia). ICOP has mostly focussed on comparisons of value added per person employed or per hour 
worked.   For some countries, the ICOP data base not only provides labour productivity, but also 
estimates of total factor productivity and unit labour cost. The ICOP project has put out over 80 
research reports, in which methods, procedures and basic data are given, so that methods can be 
replicated and revised. 
  ICOP data for manufacturing, transport and communication and wholesale and retail trade are 
now also included in  a regular publication of the International Labour Office (ILO), called Key 
Indicators of the Labour Market, 2001-2002. These estimates make use of ICOP's unit value ratios, 
but - in contrast to the estimates presented here - output and employment are directly taken from 
national accounts of individual countries instead of from industrial surveys and manufacturing 
censuses.  
 
The Groningen Growth and Development Centre aims to extend the work on industry-of-origin PPPs 
and to construct benchmark estimates for earlier time periods. In this section new industry-of-origin 
PPPs are presented for the benchmark year 1910
17. The industry-of-origin estimates should be seen as 
complements and not as substitutes of the expenditure-PPPs. At later stages, a detailed comparison of 
both types of PPPs should be made. This might reveal important information regarding international 
differences in price structure (such as the share of distribution costs and taxes). 
  On the basis of industrial census material, Burger estimated Unit Value Ratios (UVR’s) for ca. 
20 different industrial products. These product UVR’s were aggregated to branch UVR’s (weighted on 
the output value). Subsequently, these data were weighted to an aggregate sector estimate on the basis 
of the share of the various branches in total industrial value added. Branch PPPs could be calculated 
for mining, utilities, building materials, chemicals, textiles, food products, paper, leather and metal 
products. 
  The percentage of production matches ranges from 15-39% of the United K industrial 
production (and 15% for Germany, 23% for France, 31% for the Netherlands, and 39% for the United 
                                                 
17  The work on industry is derived from: A. Burger, ‘A five-country comparison of industrial labour 
productivity 1850-1990’, paper presented on the seminar Comparative historical national accounts for Europe in 
the 19
th and 20
th centuries (Groningen, 1994); For the service estimates, see: A. Burger and J.P. Smits, “A 
benchmark comparison of service productivity between Europe and the United States for 1910”, Economic and 
Social History in the Netherlands, special issue: Historical National Accounts in the Netherlands 7 (1996) 133-
159.  
  15States). This percentage is comparable with the standards achieved in modern-day research in 
productivity comparisons.
18  
 
Table 8 presents the outcomes of this new benchmark estimate of comparative labour productivity. 
 
Table 8: Comparative labour productivity in industry in 1913: extrapolations and direct 
estimates (UK=100) 
 Germany  France Netherlands
United 
States
Burger 88  79 78 248
Broadberry 119  79 103 213
Source: Burger, ‘a five-country comparison’; S.N. Broadberry, ‘Historical patterns of comparative 
productivity in manufacturing’ (mimeo, Warwick, 1993). 
 
The new, direct estimates and Broadberry’s extrapolated figures agree reasonably for the United States 
and closely for France. The differences for Germany and the Netherlands are quite large. Burger thinks 
that these differences are due to problems with the historical time series which were used for 
extrapolation. A sensitivity analysis shows that using alternative time series for the numéraire country, 
the United Kingdom, indeed leads to substantial differences. Therefore, the quality of various 
benchmark estimates can hardly be evaluated without involving the quality of the time series into the 
discussion.  
 
Estimates on comparative labour productivity in services around 1910 are estimated by Burger and 
Smits. Their assessment of comparative productivity is based on a combination of UVR’s and so-
called Quantity Relatives (in the last case comparisons are made on the basis of output volume per 
worker).  Even though the use of Quantity relatives is not ideal, at least it allows us to include this 
important sector the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Comparative productivity per branch at the geometric average of national and United 
Kingdom weights (indices; United Kingdom=100) 
 
 Transport  Communication Trade Government  Domestic  serv.
France  102 73 90 71 66
Germany  101 79 55 131 78
The  Netherlands  102 81 118 87 66
                                                 
18 B. van Ark, International comparisons of output and productivity. Manufacturing productivity performance of 
ten countries from 1950 to 1990 (Groningen, 1993), pp. 18-23. 
  16United States  155  142 96 59  84
United  Kingdom  100 100 100 100 100
Source: Smits and Burger, ‘A benchmark comparison’, p. 151. 
 
The United States have a clear lead in transport, especially due to the high relative productivity levels 
in railways. Probably the high efficiency in railways is caused to the long average distance of freight 
transport which undoubtedly resulted in scale economies. Also in case of communication, the United 
States clearly outperform the other countries, with a lead of 30-50% over the United Kingdom. The 
trade sector presents a different picture, with the Netherlands as the productivity leader. This 
phenomenon can be explained from the strong contribution of foreign trade tot total distribution in this 
small and open economy. Measured in terms of trade margins, Dutch productivity levels  in trade were 
18% higher than in the United Kingdom. The United States performed similar to the UK, whereas 
France and Germany were clearly lagging behind. For the other services (government as well as 
domestic servants), value added per worker was deflated with cost of living indices, assuming that 
differences in real wages actually reflect productivity differentials (a heroic assumption!). 
  Therefore, in table 10 two sets of aggregate service productivity estimates are presented. The 
basic estimates include government and domestic servants. In the alternative estimates the productivity 
of these last two categories is set at 100 in all countries. 
 
Table 10: Comparative productivity in services in 1910 (indices; United Kingdom=100) 
Alternative 
estimates   Basic estimates   
  national weights  UK weights national weights UK weights
France 84  95 91 103
Germany 91  86 84 86
The Netherlands  106  112 110 118
United States  124  100 129 106
United Kingdom  100  100 100 100
Source: Smits and Burger, ‘A benchmark comparison’, pp. 152-153. 
 
Table 10 clearly indicates that around 1910 the United States was the productivity leader in services, 
followed by the Netherlands which enjoyed a productivity level that was 6% higher than the figure for 
the United Kingdom. Labour productivity in services was lower in France and Germany, but the 
productivity gap between leader and followers was much smaller than in the case of industrial 
production. 
  Table 11 combines the estimates for industry and services, and also includes data for 
agriculture. These data do give an indication of differences of economy-wide comparative labour 
productivity on the eve of World War I. The new, direct benchmark estimates are compared to 
Maddison’s estimates expressed at constant dollars of 1990. 
 
  17Table 11: Comparative economy-wide productivity in 1910; GDP per worker compared to 
Maddison’s GDP per capita. (indices, 1910=100) 
 
 National  UK  Average Maddison   Difference 
France  79 77 78 64   22% 
Germany  88 75 82 73   12% 
The  Netherlands 95 87 91 82   11% 
United  States  144 114 129 108   19% 
United  Kingdom  100 100 100 100    
Source: Burger and Smits, ‘A benchmark comparison’, p.154. 
 
The direct estimates indicate that the productivity gap between continental Europe and the United 
States is smaller than the Maddison data show. Besides, the productivity lead of the Unites States over 
the United Kingdom is much larger. 
  Of course, this new view on productivity differentials around World War I may also shed a 
light on comparative productivity performance in earlier periods of time. Table 12 presents the income 
differentials –measured in terms of GDP per caput- in the period 1820-1910. These estimates were 
made by extrapolating the new 1910-estimates on the existing time series as presented by Maddison 
(=panel B). These data are compared with the original estimates made by Maddison himself (see panel 
A). 
 
Table 12: Difference in income levels, 1820-1910 (income per head of population as a percentage 
of the UK level)  
Panel  A:       
  1820 1850 1870 1890 1910
France  67 69 59 59 64
Germany  63 61 58 61 73
Netherlands 108  102  86 83 82
United  States  74 77 77 85 108
United  Kingdom  100 100 100 100 100
    
Panel B:     
    
France  71 74 63 64 78
Germany  71 69 65 68 82
Netherlands 119  113  96 92 91
United  States  88 93 92 101 129
United  Kingdom  100 100 100 100 100
 
Especially a comparison between the three technology leaders of the period 1700-1913, i.e. the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States is interesting. The new data indicate that even 
as late as 1850, in the Netherlands levels of GDP per head of population were more than 10% higher 
than in the United Kingdom. Besides, these data also shed a somewhat different light on the forging 
ahead of the United States. The new data show that already in the 1880s income per head of 
population in the US was higher than in the UK. Therefore, these new data come closer to the 
  18  19
                                                
‘revisionist’ view of Ward and Devereux, even though they argue that already at a much earlier stage 
the US surpassed the British income- and productivity levels
19. The difference in the timing of the 
overtaking can be caused by numerous factors, of which the possibility of flawed time series (in the 
lights of the problems with services as well as with deflation techniques) should not be underestimated. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper gave an overview of the main challenges that we are facing when trying to make historical 
national accounts more comparable. Previous generations of economic historians have accumulated a 
rich amount of data. This material has been systematically processed, presented and analysed by 
Angus Maddison. 
  This paper points at three areas of concern when it comes to standardising historical national 
accounts, i.e. the treatment of services, the deflation of time series, and the use of recent sets of 
purchasing power parities.  In all three cases, a sensitivity analysis was presented which showed the 
(potential) problems which may arise when working with the present, non-standardised, data. If we are 
not careful we might end up interpreting differences estimation techniques, rather than differences in 
growth and development. 
  However, this paper also indicates that many of the problems can be overcome. In the case of 
services additional research into (relative) prices and into changing input/output relations, might 
substantially improve the quality of the older sets of service estimates. Also the construction of 
historic benchmark PPPs may enhance a better comparison of income- and productivity levels over 
time. This research is time consuming, but recent work in this field shows that it is a fruitful area of 
research. Last but not least, the issue of deflation should be mentioned. Real GDP growth rates are 
strongly affected by the deflation techniques that have been used. Until now research has strongly 
focused on benchmark estimates of price levels, but the sensitivity analysis presented in this paper 
indicates that also additional research needs to be done in order to construct reliable time series.  
 
19  M. Ward and J. Devereux, ‘Relative British and American income levels during the first industrial revolution’ 
(Baltimore-New York City, 2004) 